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Who drives domestic institutional change in the face of international economic crisis? For 
rationalists the answer is powerful self-interested actors who struggle for material gains during 
an exogenously generated crisis. For economic constructivists it is ideational entrepreneurs who 
use ideas as weapons to establish paths for institutional change during crisis-driven uncertainty. 
Both approaches are elite-centric and conceive legitimacy as established by command or 
proclamation. This article establishes why domestic institutional change in response to 
international economic constraints must be legitimated by non-elites and how their everyday 
actions alter policy paths established in crisis. This is illustrated by re-examining a case 
frequently associated with punctuated equilibrium theories of crisis and institutional change: 
interwar Britain. In contrast to conventional explanations, I argue that the “legitimacy gap” 
between elite and broader public understandings about how the economy should work informed 
institutional experimentation during the 1920s and 1930s and fertilized the “Keynesian 
Revolution” of the 1940s. 
 
 
How do states know how to create the right domestic institutions to anticipate and respond to 
international economic crises? Rationalist approaches to international economic crises stress how 
domestic actors respond to external constraints in pursuit of material incentives (Gourevitch, 
1986; Haggard and Maxfield, 1996). Struggle takes place during uncertainty, from which the 
domestic winner then forms a coalition to establish a new institutional equilibrium that endures 
until the next crisis. The same dynamics then apply internationally if stable domestic coalitions 
prevail in a number of powerful states.   
 
This rationalist approach to crises has been recently challenged by economic constructivists who 
emphasize that actors do not automatically know their incentives in periods of crisis and 
uncertainty because their interests are socially constructed (Hay in this symposium; Blyth, 2002; 
Widmaier, 2004). Here uncertainty provides an opportunity for entrepreneurial actors to use 
ideas as weapons in a battle over how institutions should change to respond to a crisis. The 
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entrepreneur may then form an international community of like-minded actors who can foster 
both domestic institutional change and international cooperation through the diffusion of norms 
and economic ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; McNamara, 1998). 
 
A key problem with both rational and constructivist approaches is that they rely too heavily on 
moments of crisis and uncertainty. As a consequence there is a weak understanding of how the 
broader population may influence institutional change in a period of everyday “normality”. 
Accordingly, both rationalist and constructivist approaches have a thin conception of social 
legitimacy, ignoring the capacity of non-elite actors to constrain the choices and policy 
implementation of the materially or ideationally powerful.  
 
Within the extant literature, legitimacy is typically treated by rationalist scholars as irrelevant to 
explanation or as a resource states command to bend people to their will. Similarly, constructivist 
scholars tend to regard the proclamation of an idea by a winning entrepreneur as auto-
legitimating. Both approaches provide punctuated equilibrium models of institutional change that 
neglect questions regarding the modification of institutions pre- or post-crisis. In contrast, this 
article demonstrates how a focus on the legitimacy contests between governments and the 
broader population in everyday economic life permits a different understanding of institutional 
change. I contrast how elites claim legitimacy for economic problems against the broader 
population’s intersubjective understandings of how the economy should work. I refer to the 
difference between the two as a “legitimacy gap”. Exploring this gap permits a view of 
institutional change as more incrementally cobbled together in everyday experience than in crisis 
and uncertainty.  
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Within international political economy (IPE) the dominant view of interwar Britain is that it fits 
well with a punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change. The period is noted for 
Britain’s failure to innovate to recapture its hegemony and its inability to cope with international 
economic shocks with policy innovation (Stein, 1984; Lobell, 1999). For example, in assessing 
Britain’s response to the Great Depression, Peter Gourevitch, asks “Why was there less policy 
experimentation in the United Kingdom”? (1986: 136). From this view Britain’s institutions 
allowed it to remain in the neo-classical economic orthodoxy asserted in the early 1920s until 
Keynesian policy innovations were adopted in the late-1930s (Gourevitch, 1986: 138-140). Such 
accounts of interwar Britain provide an elite-centric and ex-post rationalization of the sources of 
change in both the British domestic and international political economies.  
 
In providing grounds for the emergence of a legitimacy gap, I draw upon economic and social 
history to interpret how the working and lower-middle classes attributed significance to 
institutional changes they valued, such as housing, wages, and unemployment.  Importantly, a 
deeper contextual interpretation reminds us that we cannot assume actors’ domestic identities 
and interests to be fixed over time and particularly so when faced with international economic 
constraints. The analysis provided here suggests that contests over the legitimacy of institutional 
change in everyday life generated policy “bricolage” as governments sought to respond to 
broader public dissatisfaction with, contra Gourevitch, experimental institutional change 
(Campbell, 2004: 65). Such contestation between the government and the broader population 
fertilized the Keynesian revolution of the 1940s.  
 
The article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys rationalist and constructivist approaches to 
institutional change in periods of crisis and uncertainty. Part II discusses the importance of 
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legitimacy to everyday types of influence on institutional change. Part III applies these 
arguments to the case of interwar Britain.  
 
 
Part I: Rationalist and Constructivist Approaches to Institutional Change 
 
Rationalist-Materialist Approaches 
 
Within early IPE literature the climacterics of hegemonic rise and decline dominated the sub-
field, particularly analyses of change that demonstrated how exogenously generated crises create 
uncertainty that allows a new hegemon to rise or impel states to cooperate on the grounds of 
material self-interest (Gilpin, 1987; Keohane, 1984). From this initial literature more 
domestically sensitive work stressed how a state’s capacity to respond to an exogenously 
generated economic crisis was determined by its domestic political structures (Ikenberry, 1988), 
with centralized systems demonstrating efficiency while pluralist systems, arguably, showed 
efficacy (Krasner, 1984; Stein, 1984; Hobson 1997). Such work sparked interest in how 
dominant economic groups formed coalitions to respond to exogenous shocks, of which Peter 
Gourevitch’s “second image reversed” perspective led the field (Gourevitch, 1986; Frieden, 
1988; Lobell, 1999). As Gourevitch explains, the general dynamics were that:  
 
In the prosperous years preceding the crisis, a policy approach and support 
coalition developed. Then came crisis challenging both policy and coalition. 
Crisis opened the system of relationships, making politics and policy more fluid. 
Finally a resolution was reached, closing the system for a time, until the next 
crisis (Gourevtich, 1986: 21-2). 
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 This logic provides a clear materialist punctuated equilibrium model of change (see Figure 1 
below). The general implication was that in “normality” institutions remained as fixed forms and 
“sticky” until shaken by a “major” exogenous economic shock that transformed coalitions and 
established a new path for institutional change (see also Haggard and Maxfield, 1996: 61). 
Gourevitch’s aim, after all, was to provide a “historical sociology of the trajectories of national 
responses to external changes” (Gourevitch, 1986: 221).  
 
What keeps actors sticking to the trajectory? For Gourevitch the propagation of economic 
ideology is critical since “Economic reality is rarely so clear that objective circumstances impose 
themselves on behavior with no mediation from ideas” (1986: 233). However, the rationalist 
view is complicated here because only ideas that “fit” with the newly established institutional 
changes have influence, because the institution establishes a “system of ideas and standards 
which is comprehensive” (Hall, 1993: 277). The role of ideas is to provide a “framework of 
collective purpose” to offer “focal points” that “shape public understandings of options” and 
legitimate already established policy choices (Gourevitch, 1986: 234; Garrett and Weingast, 
1993). Accordingly, the rationalist view is that legitimacy can be created by command and the 
public has little capacity to alter a determined path for institutional change.  As Kathleen Thelen 
has pointed out, identifying such path dependence from the vantage point of the present, and 
with a focus only on elites, invites rationalizations of how institutions evolve that excludes social 
dynamics that are off the map (2004: 25).  
 
Constructivist-Ideational Approaches 
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Constructivists argue that institutional change arises not simply from the pursuit of material self-
interest but from intersubjective understandings about an institution’s purpose (Ruggie, 1998). 
The constructivist view rejects the rationalist tendency to view ideas as post-facto justifications 
of material power dynamics, and argues that the exchange of ideas can fundamentally alter 
interests before actors engage in struggle (Sikkink, 1991: 6). At a broader level, what societies 
want from the international political economy depends not on what they can get from it, but on 
who they think they are (Abdelal, 2001).  
 
Early constructivist work demonstrated how ideas and norms about appropriate conduct were 
often introduced from the outside-in, particularly by ideational entrepreneurs who learnt about 
international norms that formed a “logic of appropriateness” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The 
diffusion of institutional forms among international policymaking elites was most likely to occur 
during periods when uncertainty generated “highly fluid conceptions of interest” (McNamara, 
1998: 7).  
 
More recently, “economic constructivists” have been concerned with understanding the inside-
out formation of intersubjective understandings about how the economy should work within a 
society. As such, they stress how actors construct exogenously generated crises and struggle over 
ideas during periods of uncertainty (Blyth, 2002; Culpepper, 2003; Widmaier, 2004). Once more 
uncertainty is essential.  Particularly important is radical uncertainty, where “agents have no idea 
what institutions to construct to reduce uncertainty” and are compelled to resort to “repertoires of 
action that resonate with their core identities” to rethink and resolve a crisis (Blyth, 2002: 36, 
267). In doing so, economic constructivists avoid relying on a structural “logic of 
appropriateness”, or the rationalist assumption that ideas are selected on self-interest and then 
attributed ex-post from an institutional outcome to the actors who designed the institution. 
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 In moving away from structural-exogenous arguments, economic constructivists stress the role of 
the ideational entrepreneur during periods of radical uncertainty, and how such actors are able to 
use ideas as weapons to try and influence institutional change to resolve a crisis. While economic 
constructivists do not argue that radical uncertainty is the only moment when institutional change 
may occur, it has been the dominant focus of their work. As a consequence, it could be argued 
that economic constructivists produce an ideational punctuated equilibrium model (see Figure 1). 
Typically, the general relationship is as follows: there is consensus around a given set of political 
and economic ideas that are institutionally maintained until a seemingly unprecedented crisis 
generates radical uncertainty over what should happen next. At this point, ideational 
entrepreneurs grab onto ideas from the menu of available options at the time and which fit with 
their normative commitments. A political struggle over ideationally mediated interests then 
ensues until a new consensus is formed. New institutional forms are then created according to the 
winner of the ideational struggle. These institutions, which embody the idea of the winning 
ideational entrepreneur, then take on a path dependent character that remains until the 
construction of the next crisis. Such a model of institutional change allows some economic 
constructivists to attribute “causal effects to ideas only where their impact is most clearly 
demonstrable” (Parsons, 2003: 12). 
 
 
Figure 1: Rationalist and Constructivist Punctuated Equilibria 
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The focus on ideational entrepreneurs has led recent economic constructivism to posit a view of 
“legitimacy by proclamation” (Seabrooke, 2006: Ch. 2). The focus on ideational entrepreneurs 
has led to a view, often implicit, that the carrier of an idea for institutional change can auto-
legitimate it among the broader population. Blyth, for example, argues that in the construction of 
Swedish embedded liberalism, Bertil Ohlin’s posting of memos to interest groups, resulting in 
the “legitimating, and thereby empowering, one set of ideas over another” (2002: 108) Likewise, 
Craig Parsons puts forward the view that ideational entrepreneurs are the carriers of “master 
frames” that establish a path dependent logic for institutional change (Parsons, 2003: 19, 32). As 
pointed out by Colin Hay, economic constructivism requires a prominent figure to provide an 
“ideational focus for the reconstitution of the perceived self-interests of the population at large” 
(2004: 210). At its most extreme, this approach adopts a “Great Men of History” approach to 
domestic institutional change from international economic crisis. 
 
The economic constructivist view of institutional change is problematic if the constructivist 
research program seeks to understand the interplay of ideas, identities and norms among broader 
society rather than a policy or ideational elite. Such a view gives the unwanted and, I believe, 
unintended, impression that while ideational entrepreneurs have agency in dealing with crises the 
rest of us are “institutional dopes blindly following the institutionalized scripts and cues around 
them” (Campbell, 1998: 383).  
 
Part II: Legitimacy and Everyday Institutional Change 
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Is it possible to move away from punctured equilibrium models of how domestic institutions 
respond to international economic shocks to see change as evolutionary and incremental? Such a 
view would place less emphasis on coalition groups or ideational entrepreneurs and permit a 
focus on the legitimation of institutional change among the broader population and their ideas 
about how the economy should work.  
 
Table 1 separates out the types of institutional change that inform claims to legitimacy by 
dominant or elite actors, and potential contests to legitimacy from non-elite or subordinate 
actors. Understanding these forms of action is important in illustrating how legitimacy gaps are 
created.  
 
Table 1: Types of Influence on Institutional Change in Legitimacy Claims and Contests 
 
A. Claims to Legitimacy  B. Contests to Legitimacy 
 
Coercion 
Threats or actions by dominant actors force 
subordinate actors to relent.  
 
Legitimacy claimed by command. 
 
 
Defiance 
Subordinate actors openly resist dominant 
actors despite costs imposed upon them.  
 
Legitimacy contested by overt protest. 
 
Mimetic Conformity 
Actors conform to dominant structures and 
behaviors in their self-interest.  
 
Legitimacy claimed by command. 
 
Mimetic Challenge 
Actors conform to dominant structures and 
behaviors to alter shared understandings. 
 
Legitimacy contested by covert protest. 
Radical Uncertainty 
Actors can use ideas as weapons to create 
change.  
 
Legitimacy claimed by proclamation. 
Axiorational Behavior 
Actors’ belief-driven actions create change 
in everyday life. 
 
Legitimacy contested incrementally. 
 
 
 
Column A. As observed above, rationalist scholars discussing domestic institutional change in 
response to exogenous economic shocks concentrate on how self-interested coalitions struggle 
 10
to direct institutional change. Once the crisis has passed, the winning coalition claims legitimacy 
through its command over the new institutional equilibrium. This may take the form of coercion, 
whereby elites use threat or force with the support of their mandate. The conditions permitting 
the establishment of a new institutional equilibrium in one state may encourage mimetic 
conformity among others. Subsequent command over a new institutional arrangement that 
responds to an external constraint may then provide the basis for a claim to legitimacy 
(Gourevtich, 1986: 235-6). These two types of change, coercion and mimetic conformity, can be 
found in realist and neoliberal thought in international relations, including most of its variants. 
The third type of action and legitimacy claim in column A is radical uncertainty, as discussed 
above. 
 
Column B. The most obvious place to start in outlining types of action for the contestation of 
legitimacy claims is open defiance through protest. Such action can be seen in everything from 
the “Battle of Seattle” over the WTO to petitions and rock concerts calling for the rescheduling 
of African sovereign debt. The second type, mimetic challenge, is less obvious. This is where 
subordinate actors conform to a power structure to challenge the dominant’s claim to legitimacy 
by exposing hypocritical behavior (Hobson and Seabrooke, 2006). The third type of change, 
axiorational behavior, is of most interest in the case of interwar Britain. Here actors’ belief-
driven actions lead to incremental changes that contest the legitimacy of the dominant structures 
(Scott, 1985; Kerkvliet, 2005). These actions need not be overtly “political”. Rather, contests to 
elite legitimacy claims are expressed by people “voting with their feet” in deciding to participate 
or withdraw from institutions in economic life. Their behavior is axiorational (shorthand for 
“axiological rationality”) in that it follows conventions about economic life and, at a broader 
level, social norms (Boudon, 2001). In the absence of perfect information, actors do not reassess 
their total interpretive framework but, instead, carry on with everyday life through small 
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incremental adjustments in conventions and ideas about how the economy should work 
(Seabrooke, 2006; Culpepper, 2003). Such behavior has an evolutionary and cumulative impact 
upon institutional change, often providing the background to what would otherwise appear to be 
“revolutionary” change (Campbell and Pedersen, 1996; Hopf, 2002b).  
 
Axiorational behavior is also watched by politicians and ideational entrepreneurs as they attempt 
to read public sentiment in order to know how to “frame” proposed institutional changes so that 
legitimacy claims have a greater chance of being accepted (Campbell, 1998: 394-8; Hopf, 
2002b). Importantly, most of this activity takes place during periods of pre- and post-crisis 
“normality”. This is important for a sociological understanding of legitimacy because while 
extraordinary actions may be justified in a moment of crisis, any resulting institutional change is 
likely to be altered in the daily grind of ordinary, everyday life (Weber, 1978: 302, 927-9). 
Importantly, axiorational behavior also suggests a separation of “institutions” from “society” 
and invites an understanding of how macro-micro-macro changes in ideas about economic life 
inform individuals’ behavior over time. Economic constructivism sorely needs to analyze this 
type of influence on institutional change.  
 
Max Weber’s economic sociology is particular useful here in understanding axiorational 
behavior (Swedberg, 1998; Seabrooke, 2006). For example, Weber’s concept of “life-chances” 
refers to how individuals attribute meaning to what is worth struggling for, not according to 
their economic interests or class position, but according to their instrumental and value-oriented 
beliefs about how the world works. Furthermore, Weber’s little acknowledged concept of 
“liquid” conventions in economic and social life posits that interests are saturated by economic 
social norms that are both constraining and enabling (Weber, 1988: 579-80; Weber, 1978: 13, 
32; Seabrooke, 2006: Ch. 2). This concept is similar to the concept of “bricolage” in sociology; 
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that agents recombine existing ideas, identities, and practices and fuse them to new ones to 
legitimate their behavior and to challenge others’ claims to legitimacy (Weber, 1978: 38-40; 
Campbell, 2004: 87). Such action is incremental, with moments of crisis subordinate to claims 
and contests to legitimacy made in everyday life.  
 
 
Part III: Legitimacy Gaps in Everyday Interwar Britain 
 
Conventional Explanations 
 
The conventional explanation from rationalists and constructivists on interwar Britain may be 
summed up as follows: after the economic crisis of World War I, the British government clung to 
increasingly outmoded neoclassical economic policies in the hope of recapturing its fading 
hegemonic status. This vain attempt at restoring international prestige led to domestic economic 
doldrums that the Conservative party was too focused on the international economy to attend to, 
the Liberal party too weak to act upon (despite having John Maynard Keynes onside), and the 
Labour party politically and intellectually incapable of addressing despite increased electoral 
support. Britain’s obsession with returning to, and then keeping on, the Gold Standard prevented 
it from engaging in domestic policy experimentation (Eichengreen, 1992). Britain was, 
ironically, subsequently thrown off the standard when the trade union controlled Labour party, 
like all left-wing parties, was unable to signal a credible commitment to international markets 
that it could keep government expenditure tight (Simmons, 1994). Worse still, general budgetary 
problems, including paying off U.S. debts accumulated during the war, led to increased pressure 
for trade protectionism and the emergence of an Imperial Preference System that provided a clear 
change from Britain’s earlier advocacy of free trade. By implication, this change signaled 
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hegemonic decline (Stein, 1984; Lobell, 1999). Economic woes persisted because interest-
coalition politics in Britain was strangely distorted by the power of the City of London and by 
the weakness of agriculture. There was no formation of an agrarian-industrial coalition for 
mutual self-interest. So while other states saw a realignment of self-interested material coalitions 
and the emergence of ideational entrepreneurs (notably Sweden and the U.S.), Britain lay 
stagnant for not only the 1920s but throughout the 1930s (Gourevitch, 1986: 135-140; Blyth, 
2002). It then took the wholesale adoption of Keynesian ideas about the governance of economic 
life during World War II, and their embodiment in Bretton Woods institutions, for Britain to 
eschew neo-classical orthodoxy and free itself from crisis (Hall, 1989; Widmaier, 2004). 
 
The above explanation views the 1920s and 1930s as a period of domestic stagnation book-ended 
by two international economic shocks from great wars. Interwar Britain is therefore a wonderful 
candidate to demonstrate the relevance of a punctuated equilibrium model of change. This 
conventional view, however, does not address the normative environmental within Britain during 
the 1920s and 1930s that made future Keynesian institutional changes “thinkable” within an 
everyday context (Hopf, 2002a: 13-15), nor does it address the legitimacy gap between elites and 
the broader public that spurred experimentation and domestic institutional innovation. Detailing 
these changes permits a view of how the Keynesian revolution of the 1940s was built upon an 
evolution of conventions and norms among the broader population. 
 
The Normative Environment: The Interwar Moral Economy 
 
Discussions of the governance of economic life in interwar Britain were framed within a moral 
discourse full of organic analogies and ideas about the capacity of the state or the market to 
civilize society. Prior to World War I the growth of a social liberal movement aimed for “social 
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unity and growth towards organic wholeness” by removing “waste” from the economic system 
(Daunton, 1996: 208). Polemicists such as John A. Hobson argued that measures of economic 
value should be “subjectivised” to become based on moral judgment about the needs of the 
community rather than the selfish preferences of the individual (1914: 15). Within this context, 
both the Liberal party and the Labour party took aim at rentiers within the City of London as an 
economic taproot of imperialism because of their failure to invest domestically and their 
preference for relying on “unearned income” from abroad. Proto-Keynesian blamed rentiers for 
domestic deflation and for “underconsumption”, and suggested that if the state intervened 
through taxation then aggregate demand could be raised and the working classes’ standard of 
living improved (Seabrooke, 2004). These latter objects of wealth, prestige, and pride had been 
denied to the working classes and lower-middle classes and their continued remoteness provided 
a key source of frustration. The legitimation of governance over economic life was therefore 
dependent on the satisfaction of a moral economy in which the “minimal culturally defined 
subsistence level” had been significantly raised since the pre-war period (Scott, 1976: 10).  
 
Following World War I, and the sacrifices it entailed, access to wages, housing, and employment 
became a common goals among working and lower-middle classes. Figures 2-4 provide an 
indication of how the broader population fared. On wages many “traditional” export-oriented 
working class occupations did badly compared to changes in the cost of living (Figure 2; the 
1921 spike is due to a dramatic but short-lived decrease in the cost of living). Housing provided 
an ongoing source of frustration as governments failed to deliver and private enterprise picked up 
the slack (Figure 3). Unemployment remained an especially acute problem (Figure 4). On base 
economic terms, the interwar years were in all a disappointment.  
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Raised expectations among the working and lower-middle classes reflected a bricolage-like 
evolution of attitudes towards the social aspects of economic life. New economic and social 
conventions emerged as class groups became more fluid, with identity rather than simply income 
becoming the key glue for association. Mass marketing also aided this process, as even “if the 
poor remained unable to attain many of the benefits of the new consumerism, this did not prevent 
them from aspiring towards them – and resenting their inability to obtain them” (Benson, 1989: 
156). Rather than anti-capitalist, “class struggle” among the working classes was commonly 
interpreted as “a struggle against the fates… [where] each family fought it out as best it could” 
(Benson, 1989: 166). Given such attitudes, it is unsurprising that the working classes and lower-
middle classes were not willing to find favor with legitimacy claims about the need to restrict the 
scope of their “life chances” due to international economic constraints. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Weekly Wages Relative to Cost of Standard of Living, 1920-1938
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Source: Mitchell, 1962: 345, 351.
 
Figure 3: Houses Built in Britain, 1900-1938
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Figure 4: Unemployment Rates in Britain, 1921-1938
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Great Expectations, 1919-1924: Inter-Allied Debts vs. Leisure and Housing  
 
In 1909 the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, constructed his famous ‘People’s 
Budget’ that introduced a range of social reform programs as a “war budget”. The budget, 
according to Lloyd George, would provide a weapon to tackle the crisis of poverty. This budget 
gained popular support from the working classes but was big on talk and small on action 
(Seabrooke, 2006: Ch. 3). In 1919 Lloyd George, now Prime Minister, told his cabinet that:  
 
Great Britain would hold out against the alarming spread of Bolshevism only if the 
people were given a sense of confidence, and only if they were made to believe 
things were being done for them. We had promised them reforms, time and time 
again, but little has been done. We must give them now the conviction that this time 
we mean it, and we must give them the conviction quickly.1
 
In the uncertainty of the immediate post-war period Lloyd George proclaimed the legitimacy of 
domestic institutional changes that would meet the raised expectations of the general population 
about how the economy should work. These changes were the extension of sickness and 
unemployment benefits to 62% of the population (Benson, 1989: 51), “out-of-work” donations for 
the unemployed because “threat of popular unrest, demanded no less” (Crowther, 1982: 137), the 
implementation of a “Homes Fit for Heroes” program to address the hunger for property among the 
working classes, and a proposal for increased public works expenditure through local authorities to 
tackle unemployment (Burgess, 1980: 207).  
 
                                                 
1 PRO, CAB 23/9 War Cabinet 539, 13 March 1919. 
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Fitting with the expectation of improved quality of life, the new social attitude was that “workers 
wanted more leisure rather than more income” (Broadberry, 1990: 274, 276). Activities such as the 
cinema and motorbike and greyhound racing all exploded in popularity and leisure and housing 
became new criteria for legitimation of economic life. Workers were willing to organize to achieve 
them. A new solidarity among skilled and unskilled workers led to a surge in trade union 
membership to a peak of eight million members (Savage and Miles, 1994: 52, 55). Picking up on 
this, the Labour party argued that the “working classes” included “all who worked by hand or 
brain”.2  
 
While trade unionism is frequently associated with the rise of central government intervention, in 
the early 1920s both the Liberal and Labour parties shared a “communitarian and decentralist view 
of local government” (Daunton, 1996: 173). All political parties, trade unions, and employers 
groups rejected the idea of the government coordinating centralized wage bargaining (Liu 1998: 60-
1). The state, however, still had a monopoly on violence and Lloyd George asserted legitimacy by 
command when sending in six infantry battalions and six cavalry regiments to halt the 1921 “Triple 
Alliance” strike by coal miners, railway workers, and industrial workers (Liu, 1998: 45, 71). 
 
The action taken against the Triple Alliance reflected a shift from enabling the domestic population 
to enjoy a better standard of living to a focus on international economic constraints. Following 
Lloyd George’s 1922 removal as leader of the war-time coalition party and the installation of 
Andrew Bonar Law as Conservative Prime Minister, the established post-war institutional path was 
diverted. The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Stanley Baldwin, argued that “money taken for 
government purposes is money taken away from trade, and borrowing will thus tend to depress 
                                                 
2 The Times 11.18.1920. 
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trade and increase unemployment” (Peden, 1984: 169). The Conservative party argued that 
international economic constraints required tight domestic expenditure. After all, they pointed out, 
Britain owed some $4.7 billion in debts to the U.S. and could only repay this by maintaining its 
position as the world’s largest trading nation (17% of world trade was British during the interwar 
period, see Simmons, 1994: 227). By 1924-5 40% of government expenditure was used to service 
interest on national debt. The subordination of the domestic economy to meet international 
obligations was publicly associated with the “assumptions of international bankers and rentiers” put 
into practice (Burgess, 1980: 196-7). Such action aggravated working and lower-middle class ideas 
of how the economy should work, particularly as politicians had rhetorically attacked the 
“parasitical rentiers who sucked resources from enterprise and prevented government from 
providing welfare for more ‘deserving’ members of society” (Daunton, 2002, 60). While the 
government had made inroads in taxing rentiers (income tax, including “super taxes” on “unearned 
income”, had increased as a percentage of government revenue from 29% in 1914 to 35.9% in 
1920; see Daunton, 2002: 46, 57), the momentum was perceived to be swinging back to the 
privileged. 
 
Tightened domestic budgets led to the diminishment of institutional reforms established in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. For example, working class housing was not supported and the 
Conservative government provided subsidies not to local authorities but to private enterprise, who 
then built houses for the lower-middle classes. This replicated the “years of frustration” among the 
working classes that preceded World War I when wages increased significantly but access to 
housing remained elusive as rentiers chose foreign portfolio investment and treated property as the 
“last remnant of feudalism” (Bernstein, 1986: 143; also note the decline in house building from 
1900-14 in Figure 3). Winston Churchill, as a Liberal social reformer, commented in 1908 that 
 21
“Under the old system people had dear food, under the present system they had dear houses”.3 
Similarly, in 1924, during the Labour party’s 11 months of government, the Labour Minister for 
Health, John Wheatley, asked: “Are we to remain without houses merely because people who have 
money to invest refuse to invest that money directly in working class houses?”4 The Wheatley 
Housing Act that followed did boost the construction of housing for the working classes, but failed 
to meet the promises of “Homes Fit For Heroes”. Domestic sacrifice in response to international 
economic constraints became once more associated with parasitic rentiers.  
 
Great Frustrations, 1925-1931: Gold Standard vs. the Great Strike 
 
Following the Labour party’s short 1924 term in office, Churchill, as the Conservative Chancellor 
of Exchequer, announced his intention to place Britain back on the Gold Standard by 1926. Keynes 
referred to this plan as the “Norman Conquest of $4.86” after the Governor of the Bank of England, 
Montagu Norman (Dillard, 1946: 129). Norman was explicit that “the international consideration” 
should take precedence over the domestic “state of trade” (Burgess, 1980: 198), while other 
Conservatives argued that although further social reform was morally just, the financial burden it 
required could only be supported by “a State which had grown up under a capitalist system”.5 
Keynes publicly countered this argument by stating that the construction of a crisis around the value 
between sterling and gold, like the gold itself, “wears thinner and thinner.”6
 
For the working and lower middle classes the “Norman Conquest” led to a decline in wages. The 
deliberate overvaluing of the pound depressed exporters and introduced deflation (Broadberry, 
                                                 
3 The Times, 05.22.1908. 
4 House of Commons Hansard, 06.23.1924. 
5 The Times 05.09.1925. 
6 The Times 05.26.1925. 
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1990: 279). Workers in the most vulnerable export industries were worst affected as wages declined 
sharply relative to the cost of living (see Figure 2).7 Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin asserted the 
legitimacy of the Norman Conquest to coalminers by invoking technical command, that “All the 
workers in this country have got to face a reduction of wages… to help put industry on its feet” 
(Dillard 1946: 132).  
 
The response from workers was the Great Strike of 1926. Coal miners wages were subsequently 
lowered and their hours increased. The Conservative government ignored the Labour party’s calls 
for state intervention to settle industrial disputes8 and instead made strikes illegal through the Trade 
Disputes Act of 1927 (Lowe, 1982: 254). Trade unions argued that the Conservative party would 
“generate a spirit of revolt, foment industrial hostility, and create social mistrust”.9 But such words 
rang hollow as trade union membership had nearly halved because white collar workers who had 
joined unions in the early part of the decade had left and become what George Orwell described as 
“Tories, yes-men, and bumsuckers” (1939: 274).  
 
The transmission of U.S. based economic shocks to Britain in 1928 and 1929 sharply increased 
unemployment (see Figure 4). Churchill was unable to assert legitimacy by command over 
institutional changes to improve the economy. His main initiative of derating industries, effectively 
providing a corporate tax cut, did not address unemployment and he rejected the idea of using 
government spending to increase aggregate demand.10 The public rejected the Conservative’s 
“Safety First” electoral platform and turned to the Labour party.  
                                                 
7 Measured by export as a percentage of product, the most export dependent workers that correspond to Figure 2 are 
cotton (44% export dependent), woolen and worsted (33%), shipbuilding, (23%), iron and steel workers (18%) 
(Simmons, 1994: 231). 
8 The Times 04.22.1926. 
9 The Times 04.08.1927. 
10 House of Commons Hansard, 05/15/1929. 
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 The great contraction in the world economy led to a loss of income from internationally-engaged 
activities and exposed the inability of Britain’s domestic economy to support the pound 
(Eichengreen, 1992: 280-1). Between 1928 and 1931, Britain’s current account surplus of £104 
million plummeted into a deficit of £114 million and the government became dependent on short-
term capital flows to assist in paying long-term debts (Simmons, 1994: 226, 230). To address this 
problem, Labour party experimented by increasing the public works budget to boost employment, 
but only within budget constraints. It also increased income taxation, cut government expenditure 
where possible, and considered the use of tariffs.  
 
The Labour party was unwilling to implement Keynesian-like demand management policies, and 
even Keynes argued in 1930 that government “pump priming” was inappropriate (Booth, 1983: 
105). Philip Snowden, the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, suggested rolling back the 
extension of unemployment benefits and trade unions warned the Labour party that “the working 
classes will resent as strongly as they can any attempt to give effect to the suggestion”.11 It was too 
late, however, and MacDonald and Snowden formed a new “National Government” dominated by 
Conservatives in August 1931. The pound was taken off the Gold Standard a month later. In doing 
so, the British government asserted, with support from Keynes, its right to use tariffs and a 
“managed” currency as a form of domestic protection (see also Simmons, 1994: 236-7).12  
 
Great Revelations, 1932-1938: Depression vs. Consumption and Housing 
 
                                                 
11 The Times 08.13.1931. 
12 The Times 03.06.1931. 
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The conventional literature on the Great Depression tells us how, unlike Sweden and the U.S., 
Britain followed neo-classical orthodox economic policy until the crisis became too severe to ignore 
new Keynesian thinking. What is missing from the British story is the sharp disruption to the 
institutional equilibrium that identifies change. There are no clear coalitional realignments with 
which to identity legitimacy by command, and even Keynes’ statements prior to 1933 are not 
sufficient to assert legitimacy by proclamation for how domestic institutions should change to meet 
the crisis introduced by the international economy.13 We know that the London Economic 
Conference of 1933 was a failure, and that, in retrospect, the “beggar thy neighbor” policies of 
currency depreciation and increased tariffs only made economic contraction worse. However, as 
opposed to the period between 1920 and 1931, the new focus on the protection of the domestic 
economy from international economic shocks led to the development of institutional changes that 
were more likely to receive the consent of the broader population.  
 
By 1932, total unemployment among the manual labor force was 23% and in some areas of Britain 
above 60% (Savage and Miles, 1994:  51). However, during this period of economic depression, 
Orwell remarked “that in a decade of unparalleled depression, the consumption of all cheap luxuries 
has increased” (1937: 171). Charles Kindleberger also notes that British wage and salary earners 
were far better off “after buying their food, drink, and tobacco” in 1932 than they were between 
1924-7 (1973: 181). As an income group, the working classes saw their weekly pay increase 103% 
between 1913 and 1938. Radio, cinema, housing, and sanitation all became part of social life and 
were viewed as rights rather than privileges (Rubinstein, 1986: 74, 78). Despite the depression, 
economic life had become more congruent with expectations about how the economy should work 
among the working and lower-middle classes. 
                                                 
13 This was rectified by a manifesto on “The Means to Prosperity” that outlined a program for state-support demand 
management polices. The Times 03.13-16.1933. 
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 During the mid-1930s the British government expanded its reach into some areas of economic life. 
In 1934 Neville Chamberlain, the Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, placed the total 
management of unemployment insurance with the central government. The British Treasury also 
redirected its intervention into the economy. By 1937 it had not fully implemented Keynesian 
demand management policies, but planned to use increased government expenditure to mitigate the 
next severe economic downturn. Without large government expenditure on road works, the 
Treasury feared the government would see major public opposition (Peden, 1984: 177-8). Similarly, 
while in 1930 the Labour party had opposed the notion of an instituted 40-hour week at the 
International Labour Organization, by 1935 National Government representatives led multilateral 
discussions to quell social unrest among the working classes back home (Lowe, 1982: 259). 
Attitudes about the role of state intervention had therefore crystallized around issues that had stirred 
great frustration among the working classes and were expressed through axiorational behavior. 
  
Accordingly, the British government intervened into the economy to encourage a housing boom for 
the working classes (see Figure 3 for overall houses built). In 1933 the Housing (Financial 
Provisions) Act provided an implicit government guarantee to building societies to support the 
development of working class housing. British banks, in part due to their isolation from 
manufacturing, were in a position to borrow and did so. As a consequence, building boomed (see 
Figure 3) and the industry accounted for 30% in increased employment between 1932 and 1935 and 
32% of total investment within Britain between 1930 and 1938 (Feinstein, 1965: 36). Eventually 
some predatory practices by building societies led to legislation in 1939 that curtailed their 
activities. However, the progress in narrowing the gap between legitimacy claims and contests 
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during a period of economic depression provided a patina that became the foothills of the 
Keynesian revolution of the 1940s (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004; cf. Blank 1977). 
 
Conclusion: Legitimacy and Everyday Institutional Change 
 
Studies of domestic institutional change and international economic crises typically view the drivers 
of change as materially-self interested coalitions or ideational entrepreneurs who establish path 
dependent changes during a period of crisis and uncertainty. Rationalist and constructivist 
approaches focus on punctuated equilibrium models in which elites generate the choice set of 
options for institutional change. Such approaches obscure how everyday actions from the broader 
population can alter the evolution of an institution from a path established by elites in crisis and 
uncertainty. As detailed above, legitimacy gaps in interwar Britain highlight that in contrast to the 
conventional view, this was a period with significant policy experimentation that relied on neither 
dramatic coalitional configurations nor the ideational lead of Keynes (cf. Gourevitch, 1986: 136). 
The impetus for these experiments came from contests from below, from changing conventions and 
perceptions of life chances among the working and lower middle classes. 
 
I have argued that elite-centric approaches of institutional change view legitimacy as established by 
command or by proclamation. Such approaches fail to provide a “historical sociological” 
understanding of change, which as noted above was Gourevitch’s aim, as well as that of many 
economic constructivists. They also replicate a general problem in the literature on institutional 
change: how to understand the “gap” between policy design and the efficacy of institutions as due 
to “the broader social environment and/or the characters of the actors themselves” (Pierson, 2004: 
108-9). To address this problem I proposed a study of legitimacy gaps that emphasized three types 
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of influence on institutional change not sufficiently addressed in the contemporary literature: 
defiance, mimetic challenge, and axiorational behavior. All three types involve non-elite 
contestation of the legitimacy claimed by elites.  
 
The last of these three types, axiorational behavior, has a great capacity to augment economic 
constructivism by calling on us to question the legitimacy of economic action within a social 
context and to unravel how economic and social conventions change to create new identities and 
social purposes (Ruggie, 1998: 869-873). It also reminds us that even if “Economic uncertainty… 
[was] the final arbiter of working class existence” in interwar Britain (Meacham, 1977: 103), people 
called upon their own ideational resources in everyday life and, in doing so, affected institutional 
change. If our focus is limited only to studying how elites behave, then we miss out on 
understanding processes of broader social legitimation that underpin thinking about how economy 
should work both at home and abroad.  
 
Such an approach also calls upon us to provide a genuine historical sociological understanding of 
domestic institutional change and international economic crises. This requires that we recognize 
that actors’ identities, like their interests, are not necessarily stable through time. For example, why 
should we immediately assume a link between the Labour party’s inability to signal a credible 
commitment to the Gold Standard and trade union influence? (Simmons, 1994). By 1930 trade 
union membership had halved from its 1920 high of 8 million, and even then only half of the 
remaining groups were willing to give the Labour party financial support (Savage and Miles, 1994: 
55, 81). Such relationships must be historically specified rather than assumed. Similarly, we should 
be careful in identifying our current period of economic globalization with a breakdown of 
“Keynesianism”. As a set of ideas for institutional change, Keynesianism in the post-war period was 
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just as contingent and contested as its development was in the 1920s and 1930s (Oliver and 
Pemberton, 2004). 
 
Finally, the British interwar case demonstrates that periods of crisis and uncertainty cannot be 
understood in abstraction from the conventions and life chances that provide the benchmarks for 
legitimacy among the broader population. It reminds us that institutions are continually remade in 
everyday life and permits us to downgrade the emphasis on discrete moments of crisis and elite 
uncertainty in material and ideational approaches to institutional change.  
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